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To plan is to ci. >se. Choose to go forward
-Mwalimu J.K. Nyerere
As Krisha to Arjuna on the field of battle not farewell but fare 
forward voyagers.
Hindu Scriptures
Those who will not learn from the past are doomed to repeat it.
George Santayana
I.
PROLEGEMONA: Planning, Conflict, Rehabilitation
To consider whether planning for post conflict reconstruction is an oxymoron whether because it 
necessarily misinterprets reality and/or is inevitably impracticable requires plausible working 
definitions of planning, conflict and rehabilitation (or reconstruction - rehabilitation - 
reconciliation) in the contexts of sub-Saharan Africa.1
Planning can be defined as systematic, consistent allocation of resources (human, material, 
natural, financial and institutional) to meet specified targets within stated time periods. It is a 
process (of which a plan document is a snapshot just as a budget document is a snapshot in the 
budgetary process). Under this definition individuals, households, enterprises, civil society 
bodies and all levels o f governmental institutions do - or at least would be well advised to - 
engage in planning.
Planning evidently has a technical component but unless it is intelligible to decision takers and 
informs the political decision making process it is nugatory or worse as an applied policy 
exercise (whether in a national government or an enterprise). Similarly planning which does not 
involve the designs of means (including institutional ones) to and built in feed back on 
implementation is unlikely to be more than fragmentarily operational and certain to be inefficient 
(in terms of goal units achieved for resource units deployed).
There are varying (sometimes overlapping) categories o f planning: strategic long term, national, 
sectoral, issue or goal subset focussed, local or provincial, enterprise, household. The coverage 
and degree of precision needed2 vary sharply.
Planning cannot be limited to financial items (even in constant prices), nor to resources more 
generally. Policies and institutions are in practice key influences on to what extent resources 
deployed do result in progress toward goals and achievement of targets specified.
Because planning involves tradeoffs to match limited resources with unlimited demands both 
reasoned tradeoffs and consistency tests are crucial. The latter are largely technical but the 
former are largely socio political or socio economic (e.g. to seek exact tradeoffs between 
marginal allocations to primary education and more effective rural policing is unlikely to be 
fruitful as the discounted present value of each is likely to be largely a matter of judgement and 
actual choices will rarely be informed primarily by that particular magnitude.)3
Planning is (by definition) in relation to a less than certain future affected by quality o f initial 
data, implementation feedbacks and external (at least to the process) shocks e.g. drought, armed 
conflict, global economic and financial conditions. This requires either the use of ranges (not
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very practical for one or even three year rolling budgets for planning implementation) or speedy 
response (semi proactive) capacity.
The criticism has been made that planning is self contradictory because it aims toward multiple 
objectives some of which are hard to define quantitatively with much precision (e.g. quality of 
primary education) and/or are at least partly non-economic (e.g. participatory local government, 
safety nets for aged and permanently disabled people) or to a degree conflicting (e.g. maximum 
safeguards against external conflict spillover and maximum rural development infrastructural 
creation). This criticism is often justified in particular cases but in general terms the most 
standard risk from multiple objectives is overcommitment - either allocating more resource 
inputs than are likely to be available or underestimating input/output ratios in respect to targets. 
Multiple goals,4 non-economic targets and less than precisely quantifiable targets are inevitable 
in any human decision taking/choice making process.
SSA national planning in its 1960's - 1970's high noon was on balance too weakly based on data 
and on analysis of relationships, too inflexible, too narrowly economic and technical, too 
ambitious (in respect to capacities for rapid change), too little contextual and too little subjected 
to material balance translation checks on financial magnitude budgets and/or other projections.' 
Its ability to procure and to use enterprise (including public enterprise) data and planning was 
always shaky and often negligible.
However, none of these factors nor the general overstating of targets (which had multiple causes 
and created more a case for better analysis, faster feedbacks, reduction o f overcommitment and 
more flexibility rather than for abandoning national planning) was the primary cause of the
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1980's - 1990's disintegration and nearly total abandonment of comprehensive national planning. 
These included:
a. a change in global political economic climate including response to the 1970's inflation with 
low growth shocks and the 1980's disintegration of Eastern European economies self 
characterised by planning (albeit in a form very different from that in Africa);
b. much greater vulnerability to much larger and more frequent shocks - notably drought, 
violent conflict and external market/finance terms and access - and consequential increases in 
the complexity of management (public or private, government or enterprise)
c. increasingly uncertain (as to amount, specific allocation and institutional channelling) 
external resource flows (public and enterprise) which - together with "a" - made formal 
comprehensive medium term planning exercises ineffective and potentially 
counterproductive through reducing resource inflows.
The apparent rapid rise, brief high noon and rapid decline of governmental/national planning in 
SSA is somewhat more apparent than real.
African planning has its roots in colonialism and dates back - in strategic form - to the turn of the 
last century. The Congo Free State and the Belgian Congo were planned as enterprises (the 
former inefficiently beyond the very short run, the latter much more so over almost half a 
century) emphasising the export sector with its related physical infrastructure and other inputs 
(including primary and vocational education and reliable, relatively cheap urban, mine and 
plantation oriented food production). In the then Gold Coast Governor Guggisberg's transport 
infrastructure - human investment in health and education strategic plan aimed at enabling higher
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levels and more diversity of production was clearly the result of a planning process and initially 
probably consistent with reasonable project resource availability and relative programme 
allocations. While perhaps less formalised, the French 'mise en valeur' (promotion by 
infrastructure provision and policy intervention - including major market rigging for both 
domestic and French producers) strategy did constitute economic planning even if - arguably - 
the glory o f France and the provision of livelihoods to otherwise unemployable 
professionals/otherwise redundant troops and to otherwise non-competitive enterprise bulked 
large among its aims.
The generalisation of colonial planning after 1945 largely took the form of capital project 
shopping lists, overall economic projections (a notably Francophone element linked to planning 
and plans in France) and certain sectoral goals (e.g. education and health coverage) more 
dependent on personnel and recurrent than on capital budget allocations. Coherent relationship 
building among these elements - and particularly in respect to policies to link them - was 
uncommon at least within the planning and associated decision taking process.
From these roots grow the national planning surge o f the 1960's and 1970's. In principle the 
three strands were co-ordinated and policies interwoven, but the degree to which this represented 
reality was often low. Similarly the capital - recurrent budget iteration process was generally 
poor and the concept of strategic and medium term planing leading into and informing rolling 
three year and immediately operational one year budgets was rarely perceived and still more 
rarely applied.6
The decline o f national comprehensive plans from the early 1980's has been paralleled by the rise 
of a plethora o f other types of plans:
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a. Overall Strategic (e.g. Country X 2004 or 2020) with more or less clear goals, broad policy 
outlines, a few key projects and more or less roughly estimated resource requirements 
(sometimes going well beyond state fiscal into enterprise and household sectors and human 
investment). The objectives often include poverty reduction and universal basic service 
provision;
b. Sectoral Strategic - (e.g. Education 2020) with more tightly defined goals, more precisely 
estimated targets, more specific policy packages and at least attempts at rolling three to five 
year budgets;
c. Crisis Response - whether war, drought, terms of trade or fiscal imbalance - usually focussed 
on targets over a one to three year period and also focussed on unsustainable imbalance 
containment and reduction through varying mixes o f domestic cutbacks and external resource 
mobilisation;7
d. Medium Term Sectoral - (e.g. infrastructure, agriculture) with varying degrees o f goal-target 
-policy-resource allocation integration and of realism;
e. Social- (especially basic service generalisation and poverty reduction, but on occasion 
Gender or Environmental Sustainability or Child focused) again with a variety o f time frames 
(usually medium term) and of goal-target-policy-resource allocation-budgetary process 
integration. These in particular suffered from non-integration into overall macroeconomic 
planning and - consequentially - marginal and vulnerable resource allocations at the 
Budgeting Process phase.
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What has been conspicuously absent8 are overarching medium term operational planning process 
informing rolling and annual budgeting and testing the individual plans for inconsistency and 
subjecting them to an iterative process of reconciliation with each other and with resource 
availability projections and outcomes. At the extreme one has the stunning mismatch of more or 
less parallel Strategic Comprehensive Plans, moderately wide medium term SAPs and 
exceedingly constraining cash balance (sometimes monthly) operational Budgeting processes.
The disastrous outcome - in some respects and some countries worse than 1985 - 1995 SSA 
experience in non war afflicted countries - in Central and Eastern Europe as set out in UNDP's 
1999 Regional Survey strongly suggest that the costs o f fragmented, uncoordinated, planning are 
severe.9
The long term strategic goals o f any national planning process (and less uniformly of other levels 
o f planning process) are largely exogenous to it, albeit there are consequential feedback effects. 
Whether it is better to plan to maximise GDP growth (total resource availability), HDI (average 
human welfare) or SDI (articulated human welfare with a weighting to exclusion reduction) is a 
socio-political decision not subject to scientific let alone econometric techniques. Nor - on less 
extreme assumptions -  can the tradeoffs among Peace with Law and Order; Overall Resource 
Base Expansion; Generalisation o f Basic Services, Human Investment; Livelihood Expansion -  
Human Capital Provision -  Safety Net Supply be handled on any endogenous technical basis1" 
let alone one uniform to all countries at all times.11
The forgoing illustrates an integral limitation of external leadership in a national (or sub­
national) planning process even at the technical level. External personnel and institutions are 
unlikely to have (or be willing/able to organise) enough contextual (especially socio political.
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political economic and socio economic) data and understanding to comprehend or relate 
effectively (including critically as well as supportively) to decision taker goals, targets and 
relative priorities. Unless they explicitly recognise this, counterproductive (even when amicable) 
relationships are likely.12
However this is not to argue that formal planning or planning technician/decision informers is 
analogous to dusting or filing -  marginal in importance. How resources are allocated matters 
even —perhaps especially -  if the goals are not primarily economic nor output targets/results 
readily measured quantitatively. Assuring understanding of the goals, targets and how resources 
are allocated matters. Technical planners have a role analogous to the ones Keynes assigned to 
economists as plumbers. Anyone who has seen urban epidemics related to low levels of access 
to pure water, pastoral livelihood destruction from derelict water systems in the face of drought 
or industries halted by breakdown in water availability will understand why plumbers matter 
(perhaps even more than Keynes in a context in which such disasters were much further away 
and costs o f the breakdown that did occur more marginal). Checking interactions, spread and 
feedback effects (negative and positive), iterating among targets and allocations to present a 
range of feasible result packages, warning of major hard to estimate wishes are the business of 
the planning technician/decision informer. Their potential impact -  for better or for worse -  is 
not marginal.
Neither “expert” refusal to operate in a decision taker set goal framework (especially if the 
domestic decision takers involved have substantial legitimacy, consistency and rationally) nor a 
passive “Yes, Minister” approach (with or without attempts at passive or not so passive sub rosa 
altering of goals) is likely to be particularly productive. E.g. to say “no” to security force 
proposals in a context of real external security threats is likely to be ineffective -  and makes little
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economic sense given the costs of war and probabilities of effective deterrence.13 Similarly to 
fail to warn that security spending above some limit would cripple state and economy (and thus 
future resource availability for security forces) and that certain types of spending (e.g. main 
battle tanks and supersonic jets -  as opposed say to armoured personnel carriers/field artillery 
and heli gunships) seemed relatively cost inefficient in delivering deterrence and (especially) 
response capacity is neither efficient planning nor efficient security provision.14
What is needed is an iterative process in which the planning technician/decision informer’s 
prime roles are:
a) to point to case of general overdetermination (targets whose resource requirements clearly 
exceed resources likely to be available);
b) targets which at operational level contradict each other;
c) proposed allocations seriously inadequate for target achievement;
d) positive and negative interactions and feedbacks which imply that different allocations could 
ensure a package of practicable targets likely to be more desirable from a decision taker point 
of view;
e) “no through road” warnings in respect to proposed programmes policies and projects most 
unlikely to achieve significant progress toward targets and to have negative side effects 
actually moving results away from them;
f) combined with reasoned -  preferably costed -  suggestions as to alternative means of moving 
toward the goals/targets.
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This is perhaps not very scientific, model friendly or econometrician compatible (especially with 
bad, limited data and apparently rapidly changing structural relationships). However, it is 
attuned to the realities o f informing a decision taking process, avoiding egregious waste o f 
resources and making results at least incrementally -  and often more substantially -  consistent 
with targets and goals (not least moving in the intended direction).
To play this type o f role, a planning process and its technicians/decision informers and its 
technico/political decision takers need to understand both the decision making process and the 
goals of main decision takers and to accept them as parameters. To seek to use technical 
expertise and hidden agendas to alter goals and take over decision taking is most unlikely to 
succeed and -  assuming any governmental and social sector institution legitimacy and 
accountability -  deeply problematic ethically.15
Conflict is defined for purposes of this paper as widespread armed conflict (perhaps as a rule of 
thumb directly afflicting at least half the territory and 40% of the population). Conflict o f 
interest or non-violently managed/mediated tensions even if there are local outbreaks o f violence 
are not included. Neither are military coups with no widespread, continuing violence.
Borderline cases include regionalised violence (e.g. the eastern half of Ghana's Northern Region) 
which at regional, but not national, level have analogous results and an identical need for 
reconstruction - rehabilitation reconciliation. Cases in which an oppressive regime, widely 
perceived as illegitimate and facing rising - but still largely suppressed - opposition moving 
toward violence have been removed rapidly and basically non-violently are also borderline (e.g. 
Nigeria. Mali perhaps illustrates both sets of characteristics as the northern regional especially in 
respect to the Delta states- so called Touareg-insurgency led to the relatively peaceful, if 
military, overthrow of the regime and major strategic policy shifts). In these cases there are
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certainly differences of degree and usually of kind in respect to the robustness of state 
administration and service delivery capacity, of the economy and of the financial system and a 
basic absence of the return home and need for r-r-r o f large numbers of internally 
displaced/international refugee households.16
It may be argued that "failed states" - in the sense of entities which have lost the capacity to 
administer, enforce law and reasonably just order to deliver either basic services and to create a 
setting consistent with growth or even stability in production and are viewed as illegitimate by 
most of their subjects -result in a situation confronting the new government analogous to that on 
armed conflict's termination. In practice the distinction rarely arises since total state failure, as in 
Sierra Leone from the 1970's, the then United Republic of Somalia from the mid 1980's and then 
Zaire from at the latest the early 1980's, almost always leads either to civil war (whether largely 
domestic or, as is usual, partly externally manipulated) or to a highly oppressive regime which 
somewhat increases state capacity but with a high risk of future armed conflict (some would cite 
Burkina Faso as an example albeit its characterisation as a "failed state" under President Sankara 
is problematic). State failure can precede and lead into or be caused by17 civil war; in practice it 
is usually associated with it.
Post-conflict is a fuzzy term. It is clear when a full scale civil war exists e.g. Angola, Sudan. 
Equally clear are some post war r-r-r contexts e.g. Somaliland, Mozambique. But in other cases 
a significant level of widespread armed conflict remains and threatens to erupt into a new war 
period e.g. Rwanda, Burundi, post Mobutu Congo before the 1998 invasion/insurgency, Sierra 
Leone, probably Liberia.. No turnpike theorem is appropriate to describing the path toward 
established peace. Initial post conflict situations usually incorporate pockets of violence and real 
possibilities of renewed war. The opposite side of that coin is that even in clearly civil war
conditions there are likely to be areas (geographic and programmatic) in which even an 
enfeebled state can carry on significant basic service delivery, law and order and administration 
functions (e.g. Mozambique in main towns and some rural areas).
How a conflict ends as we", as its prior causes has a major impact on priorities for rehabilitation 
as well as the probabilities o f success. In general it can be said that the shorter the conflict, the 
less the cost (especially in lives, livelihoods, human capital and social capital including state 
legitimacy), the greater degree to which the war is perceived18 as either a liberation struggle (e.g. 
Somaliland) or as one instigated and manipulated by external actors (e.g. one broadly perceived 
strand in Mozambique) and the less deep and systemically entrenched the divisive or corrosive 
forces which led to the violence (e.g. Rwanda and Burundi as examples of extreme difficulty the 
less difficult and faster rehabilitation can be). Physical damage seems to matter less as more 
surprisingly, does brutality - short o f systemic genocide - (e.g. Renamo in Mozambique behaved 
brutally as a strategy as did Barre forces in Somaliland - luckily they were not from Somaliland - 
but both are cases of relatively rapid, sustained and rooted rehabilitation). Similarly the survival 
(or inheritance) of a state with some legitimacy, institutional structure, revenue raising capacity 
and capacity to deliver desired services (all of which were absent in post Mobutu Congo but all, 
to a degree, present in the Uganda state inherited by President Musuveni and in some respects 
the Ethiopian one taken over, albeit radically restructured socio-politically, by the present 
Ethiopian government).
The reality and the perception o f permanence in respect to cessation of conflict of general 
(including elite) opposition (or otherwise) to its renewal or of apparent prizes of victory (or their 
absence) encouraging key actors to revert to violence, and the presence or absence of external 
bases/allies/sources of supply for continued attempts to destabilise/vanquish the new regime are
also crucial. Even in pure material resource terms planning is hampered if pure security 
allocations must be massive relative to resources for state revival and any reconstructed 
infrastructure, restored public service programme or rehabilitated livelihood is at risk of being 
destroyed again (e.g. contrasting Mozambique vs. Rwanda, Somaliland vs. Sierra Leone, Mali 
vs. Liberia).19
Rehabilitation after conflict (or return - reconstruction - rehabilitation - reconciliation) is a 
process o f restoring livelihoods, infrastructure, institutions, human capital, basic services, social 
capital (especially across groups on opposite sides of the clash) and a political culture of pre 
conflict resolution of differences. Not all aspects are equally suitable for formal planning 
techniques but the components interact and - up to a point -resource costings and probable levels 
of direct and indirect benefits can be estimated.
Four points should be made to avoid misunderstandings. First rehabilitation does not imply 
return to the prewar status quo (or modus virendi) for at least four reasons:
1. The causes o f the conflict are likely, in large part, to like in the previous structures and 
relationships;
2. in many cases a radical political restructuring has occurred which necessarily informs all or 
almost all aspects of rehabilitation;
3. both overall and in specific cases either more or less will be a necessary minimum - e.g. in 
respect to a failed in the sense of imploded state on the one hand or a corrupt, oppressive 
state based on force on the other. Very often the nature of relationships as well as orders of
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magnitude will require alteration e.g. state farm - plantation - small farming family balance, 
purposes and patterns of economic intervention;21
4. the costs and destructions of war may create analogues to 'greenfield sites' economically, 
socially and politically. Restoration of production may be most efficient if  the products are 
altered e.g. it is doubtful whether Mozambique should rebuild its heavily damaged sugar
plantation sector given the global price patterns and trends for sugar and the plantations'
• 22 historic need for subsidies.
Second, post conflict rehabilitation execution as such cannot take place nationally until the war 
has ceased or at least formally halted in respect to areas including most of the population,
• • • 23physical capital and national resources and both is - and is widely perceived to be - unlikely to 
reignite.
Evidently there is a blurred area as to extent and probable tenacity of peace - or at least non-war. 
Somaliland has been a case of rehabilitation since 1991 but in 1993, 1995 and contingently until 
the Berao insurgency was mediated in 1996, in one province until 1998 and, perhaps, in another 
even today peace has been neither total nor fully secure. Over time the trend in breadth and 
depth of peace and the falling number, scope and durations of interruptions allows a positive 
judgement. By this standard Sierra Leone is not yet past conflict and Liberia is very much 
borderline.
In such cases - as in all public or private policy - risk needs both to be taken into account and to 
be managed. The cost of waiting for certain, stable peace before beginning rehabilitation is 
likely to be never to attain the starting point.24 The cost of ignoring risk is likely to be a large 
volume of wasted (destroyed, damaged, unusable) capital spending and, less uniformly, serious
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loss of personnel. In high risk situations/areas an economic case exists for concentrating on 
visible, quick, priority need related programmes with low capital costs. Primary and 
educational/preventative health and some aspects of agricultural extension meet that test as do 
seed and tool distribution, vocational training and some rural and small town water supply 
rehabilitation. Main highways, bridge and dams do not, though ports may.
But some discussions o f rehabilitation include countries like the Sudan which are very clearly 
not in any sense post conflict - despite occasional broader or narrower truces. These are cases in 
which only survival support can be provided except in some cases (not the Sudan) for isolated, 
stable peaceful areas. Indeed in the Sudan even forward planning toward post conflict 
rehabilitation (beyond a broad list of strategic objectives and targets) is very difficult because 
whether one is to posit two states or a confederation with what types of state and at what dates is
• 25significant but exceedingly unclear.
Third, however, how survival assistance is organised and -to a lesser extent - its content do feed 
into initial rehabilitation potential. Keeping people alive turns on access to food, medical 
services (probably particularly health, education, vaccination and 'first aid') and water. Except in 
secure refugee settlements with good fortune as to funding, little more is likely to be possible (or, 
as in the Sudan, even much less).
However, with whom external actors work and how seriously they seek to build up recipient 
participation in programme design and in operation (including operational management) does 
matter because it is an investment in sustaining or rebuilding social capital. Similarly attempting 
to support productive activity (whether in places of refuge or the field) matters not only because 
own output enhances survival chances, but because return to livelihoods after the conflict is
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likely to be faster and more effective. How much beyond seeds and hand tools is possible 
beyond especially favourable camp or living with kin in peaceful transborder contexts is, 
however, doubtful.26
Fourth, neither rehabilitation nor rehabilitation planning is likely to be effective if perceived as a 
marginal social service or safety net add on outside main macro economic planning and 
programming. There are two very simple but very compelling reasons for this: in the absence of 
real opportunities to regain livelihoods and service access displaced persons, refugees and 
demobilised combatants will lose hope and quite probably go back to conflict (the old war, a new 
insurgency or banditry and the output, export, food supply and (as - serving a viable indirect tax 
system) payoffs o f rehabilitation can often be as high and rapid or higher and speedier than of 
those sectors on which macro economic programming usually focuses. Risking return to 
violence and overlooking/underinvesting in high, early growth potential opportunities are not
27good macro economic planning.
To identify tradeoffs and interactions - and to avoid overdetermination - requires either explicit 
incorporation of rehabilitation into strategic through budgeting process comprehensive macro 
economic planning or an iterative interaction among sectoral planning processes to achieve a 
viable overall macro planning resolution.
II.
POST CONFLICT REHABILITATION: Niche or Main Theme
Evidently post conflict rehabilitation is not a major theme in countries which have not 
experienced armed conflict. Therefore, it is not a universal element applicable to all
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development planning processes in SSA or elsewhere. Neither, however, is it a niche concern 
relevant to a limited handful o f small countries.
At least 50 countries either have national or substantial regional conflicts today or have recently 
achieved cessation of these conflicts but not yet achieved any state reasonably describable as full 
rehabilitation. The population o f the countries (or afflicted areas in ones in which the conflict is 
zonal) is of the order of 500,000,000 persons. It is possible to challenge a few of the inclusions 
but rather easier to suggest plausible additions and to identify countries likely to tip into conflict.
The list is not limited to Africa, indeed a majority are non African. Nor to it confined to very 
small ones, the average is about 10,000,000 with several over 20,000,000 and some near or over 
50,000,000
Papua New Guinea (Bouganville), East Timor, Cambodia, Sri Lanka,
Afghanistan, two or more CIS Asian Republics, Turkey (Kurdish zone), Iraq,
Yemen, Lebanon, Palestine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Chechnya, Albania,
Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Serbia, Mexico (Chiapas plus), Haiti, Colombia, Peru 
(Andean Plateau), El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras, Algeria,
Western Sahara, Mali (Saharan Zone), Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, Liberia,
Congo (Brazzaville), Tchad, Central African Republic, Congo (Democratic),
Angola, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Mozambique, Namibia, Comoros, Ethiopia,
Eritrea, Somalia, Somaliland, Sudan.
The costs of war -  and therefore the starting point for reconstruction - are high in terms of lives 
lost, physical condition (ability to rebuild) of survivors, Gross Domestic Product, livelihoods, 
physical damage, institutions, human capital, social capital and residual instability. The relative 
weights -  to each other and overall by country -  vary widely.
The total of deaths of people who would have lived in the absence of war in SSA almost 
certainly exceeds 10 million.28 In Mozambique it was of the order of 2 million over 1980-1992 
and the Sudanese death toll may be higher. In Angola and probably Rwanda it is 1 million or
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more as it is in Ethiopia if one assumes the 1984-85 famine would have been contained at low 
death levels in the absence of war.20 Sierra Leone. Somalia, Burundi, Liberia, Nigeria (during 
the Biafra war) and Congo (Democratic) have probably each lost at least 200,000 lives each to 
war and 500,000 in the last two cases.
The loss o f life is predominantly civilian (probably 95 per cent) and on average over half indirect 
resulting from lack of access to medical services, food and water, and to exhaustion from freed 
flight. Probably over two-fifths are infants and young who are the most vulnerable to these 
shocks.-’0 The old who are almost equally vulnerable may account for only two per cent because 
in most o f SSA only about five per cent of pre-war populations were over 60. Famine deaths are 
up to a third. ’1 Genocide (narrowly defined so that only Rwanda and Burundi are included)3" is 
over a tenth and other civilian deaths at the hands of combatants -  dominantly by massacres33 not 
incidental to combat -  about a tenth.
The impact on survivors is also often desperate and in part irreversible. Sustained malnutrition 
and lack o f access to health services is permanently mentally, emotionally and physically 
damaging even if less evident than mine and terrorist victims, lacking limbs, eyes, ears and/or 
noses."4 Equally hard to estimate without in-depth studies are cases of traumatisation and 
desocialisation as a result of being combatants outside normal social structures or mores and of 
repeated forced migration and harassment. In Mozambique UNICEF/'SCF estimates suggest 
250,000 traumatised children.
Gross Domestic Product losses in SSA probably exceed $100,000,000,OOO35 - about half in 
Southern Africa (excluding South Africa)"6 and the rest concentrated in Central Africa, the 
Sudan and the Horn albeit the current output level and cumulative losses relative to territorial
18
output are also very high in Liberia and Sierra Leone and were so over much of 1979-81 and 
1981-86 in Uganda. In Mozambique, 1992 output was less than half what it would have been in 
the absence of war, a situation probably pertaining to the Sudan, Liberia and Sierra Leone today.
The largest source o f output loss -  and one continuing after the cessation of war -  is lack of 
maintenance and investment exacerbated by destruction of existing capital stock. Military 
expenditure is largely damaging in this way -  it eats up resources otherwise available for directly 
productive, infrastructural and human investment capital.37 The same applies to destruction or 
immobilisation o f existing physical capital (and to repair bills to repair and replace it).
Loss of livelihoods is frequently higher (as a proportion of pre-war livelihoods significantly 
damaged or wiped out by war than that of GDP. This is hardly surprising because almost all 
SSA wars have been fought predominantly in rural areas and in extreme cases (Mozambique, 
Angola, Southern Sudan) over half of all rural households have become refugees or internally 
displaced persons with low to negligible new livelihoods. Serious livelihood attrition is 
consistent with lower than average (Angola) or very low (Namibia) GDP loss if most rural 
households are -  even initially -  very poor and relatively small (under 10 per cent in Angola and 
perhaps a quarter o f that in Namibia) contributors to GDP.
Physical damage -  especially to transport infrastructure, all rural and small town infrastructure 
and housing and power transmission -  is probably of the same order of magnitude as GDP but is 
hard to calculate because the present value of older portions of the capital stock is exceedingly 
hard to estimate and the cost o f repairing or catching up with undone maintenance in contrast to 
replacement are equally subject to widely varying estimates.
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In some cases war has severely intensified pre-existing failure of (especially governmental) 
institutions while in others it has eroded ones which were becoming stronger in the pre war 
period (e.g. Sierra Leone, Zaire/Congo in the first case and Mozambique in the second). In 
either case the cost is substantial. Lengthening time from breakdown to reconstruction increases 
the time and resources needed for recovery and restoring institutional capacity requires more 
than replacing capital stock, budgetary flows and personnel.
Human capital loss results from loss of life, gaps in or reductions of flows of newly qualified 
personnel and forced or semi- voluntary emigration, e.g. There has been no functioning 
University in Somalia or Somaliland for a decade and few who obtained higher education abroad 
since then are now in Somalia or Somaliland; as a result most senior public servants in 
Somaliland are aged 55-65 with a very limited number of highly qualified 30-40 year old 
professionals to be their successors, let alone expand the service to achieve at least moderately 
adequate basic service delivery capacity. Similarly Rwanda lost over half it its central and over 
three quarters of its local government servants - dead or fled.
Social capital (including political culture) costs are widespread and high albeit unequal both as to 
present impact and post/present/future potential for rebuilding. Trust - especially among civilian, 
supporters in opposite sides and among the very large numbers (sometimes majorities) who were 
disenchanted with both (or all in the case of multi-sided conflicts) - has frequently been eroded 
toward the point of non-existence. How lasting that situation is, is much harder to evaluate and 
may be highly contextual. Both mediation and reconciliation have positive - and surprisingly 
fast - track records in Mozambique and Somaliland but not in Angola or Somalia. Similarly 
social networks have frequently become narrower - e.g. mixed villages and neighbourhoods were 
common in pre war Rwanda and Burundi but are not since 1994.
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The last major cost category is residual/consequential violence. Demobilised combatants - 
especially in the absence of well designed adequately resourced programmes into livelihoods 
above the absolute poverty level - are likely in numerous cases to return to the only skill and 
tools they know - those of violence and weaponry. Residual pockets o f violence - whether of 
banditry or bitter enders - are common. The two greatest potential costs, however are:
a. reignition of war (whether on the old or on new lines) because o f an inadequate (including 
seriously differently interpreted) peace settlements or inadequate rehabilitation;
b. continuation of the war from nearby external bases by the vanquished party (interahamwe 
against of Rwanda and its analysis - against Burundi).
Perhaps surprisingly revenge killings after the cessation of war have not been a substantial 
factor. In some cases - e.g. Rwanda - this has required sustained government pressure including 
draconic action against some offenders. In others - e.g. Mozambique - while the government has 
certainly opposed retaliation there appears to have been limited need for action to enforce that 
opposition. It is argued that revenge killings in Sierra Leone are likely to be a serious problem - 
a belief apparently shared by many ex army and Revolutionary United Front cadres - but logic
38and pre-settlement speculation in Mozambique ran on the same lines.
Relative levels of loss - to each other and relative to pre war - vary widely. No generalisation - 
beyond appallingly high levels - appear likely to be sustainable. This would suggest that entry 
points and priorities for rehabilitation planning also may need to be substantially different in 
different countries.
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Globally it is just possible to argue that the epidemic of wars have marginal costs - the countries 
afflicted probably account for less that 2% of global GDP and (even in the absence of war 
probably at most 5%) have very limited military capacity relative to large economy armed 
forces' 5 and - except in the Balkans - are not next door to OECD or EU club members.
That is a rather ahuman approach given that up to one human being in ten is afflicted by war or 
the consequences o f recent war in her/his country. In any event it is less than accurate because 
o f very real regional spill over effects. These are perhaps most severe in SSA but clearly apply 
also to the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasses and the Himalayan periphery.
Spread and spill-over costs include:
a. deterrent (or border repellent) military spending;40
b. military spending and participation in conflict in support of neighbours;41
c. regional peace maintaining, restoring or enforcing involvement;42
d. loss o f sources and markets;
e. costs o f hosting refugees;
f. external image regionally and globally not least in relation to external official and 
enterprise sources of finance.
Tanzania and Zimbabwe have had military budgets primarily related to external threats and 
successful in keeping conflict on their own soil to a minimum. Similarly, both (as well as 
Angola) have deployed troops into combat in support of neighbours they perceived as in danger 
of being overwhelmed by external or externally-backed aggression with consequential threats to
their own security. Nigeria has incurred heavy costs in seeking to avert, reduce, end war in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone.43
The Central African conflict triggered by the RPF invasion/Interahamwe genocide in Rwanda 
has spread to involve at le ;t eight states (Rwanda, Burundi, Congo (Democratic), Congo 
(Brazzaville), Chad, Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia and -  perhaps -  the Sudan) in combat and 
imposed heavy deterrence costs on Tanzania. It has led to two externally catalysed civil wars in 
Congo and is -  despite the Lusaka Peace Accord -  by no means in sight of resolution either in its 
transborder or, especially, its internal aspects. Nor has it resolved the initial problem -  the red 
thread of Interahamwe genocide (and pre-emptive anti wa Hutu violence in Burundi) which has 
woven itself into both Congo (Democratic) wars as well as those in Congo (Brazzaville) and the 
CAR (in both cases IH have fought as mercenaries). IH remains in the north-east quadrant of 
Congo (Democratic) and (now) in the Kabila army and -  while crippled through base point 
constriction -  in the analogous Burundian external armed opposition.44
Trade losses, while not comparable to military costs, can be significant especially zonally.
Before 1994 Ngara District in Tanzania’s largest markets (for beans and coffee) were in Rwanda 
and Burundi and they were important manufactured goods (e.g. beer, textiles, cigarette) suppliers 
while transit traffic revenues were arguably its most dynamic sector. That ended abruptly in 
1994 and impacted sectors have recovered slowly and partially.
Refugee costs are a contentious issue. A study in Ngara in 1994 suggests that on current 
household account Ngara may have been in a break even position with commercial sector and 
banana gains offsetting bean grower losses. But the ecological impact including demands on 
women and girls’ time -  to go further to secure water and fuel -  were very significant as were
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the security costs on the border and in/around the camps incurred by the Tanzanian 
government.4^
Countries in what are perceived as war zones -  even if they are not significantly unstable and 
involved in neighbours’ w, : s, pay a high price because both tourists and investors are often 
vague on distances, actual locations of conflict, and how rapidly conflicts are likely to spread. 
They avoid risk and stay out o f the whole zone.
For a country -  however at peace domestically -  to be in a zone in which wars exist is to live in a 
high cost and dangerous neighbourhood.
III.
The review to this print supports seven propositions:
1. Planning as a means o f informing the decision taking process to allocate resources toward a 
set of goals and targets is neither an oxymoron nor a process only rarely applicable (whether 
at government, local government, enterprise or 'household level');
2. What type of planning can be effective in context related - the weaker the data base (and the 
less suitable for projections), the greater the degree of structural change sought, the more 
limited the analytical capacity and the greater the uncertainty as to resource availability 
and/or the impact o f external shocks, the greater the case for strategic planning focussed on a 
limited number of priority targets with flexibility focussing on achieving movement in the 
right direction rather than literal attainment of quantified targets by specified datas;45
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3. Strategic and sectoral planning linked directly to budgets, via policies, programmes and 
projects is usually easier to formulate in SSA than comprehensive plans. The drawback is 
that this approach does make it harder to estimate linkages and positive or negative side 
effects and - especially - for jcision takers (or planning technicians) to understand tradeoffs 
among goals, targets and - especially - budgetary allocations/probable short term results;
4. Therefore the case for a comprehensive one year policy - budget package and a strategic 
inter-relationship/trade off overarching formulation remain;47
5. The uses of a planning process are not limited to the economic (or even the readily 
quantifiable material) aspects o f decision taking. All goals and targets require allocation of 
scarce resources and almost all meaningful targets can be compared with results - at least in
• 48respect to direction and frequently order of magnitude of change;
6. Wars have particular, identifiable costs and leave contexts distinctly different from those of 
economic, public service and governance decline without war. That suggests that either 
different overall planning processes or sectoral strategic to operational to budgetary 
processes within an overall frame will be appropriate for post war rehabilitation.
7. If the sectoral approach is used then it must feed into whatever overarching analysis 
(preferably on a larger and deeper than annual budget basis) is used to determine resource 
allocation. Any sector not treated as of major macro economic significance and linked 
directly to macro economic analysis and programming will - in practice - be marginalised 
and under allocated.49
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Those propositions create a basis justifying attempting systematic post war rehabilitation 
planning. They suggest some of the parametric constraints and, perhaps, possible approaches. 
They provide neither a checklist of probable elements, a system for prioritisation nor much 
indication how many useful gem alisations (beyond very overarching resource allocation 
procedures) can be identified and how they interact with contextual specificities and varying - 
but usually high - degrees of uncertainty/risk.
The checklist is perhaps the easiest to formulate. It can also be encapsulated. One of the clearest 
formulations is that of a very senior, very old, very peace and order oriented (albeit willing to 
fight for those ends) Somali elder at Baidoa in 1995. He set out three goals within an overarch 
(or built on a foundation);50
1. water, without which people, livestock and crops cannot survive;
2. food, also essential to survival and ability to produce;
3. health and education without which ability to learn and to produce are stunted and full human 
life (as contrasted with mere survival) is unattainable.
The overarch stated was a frame of peace and order within which people could set about 
achieving the other goals/targets.
At first glance this formulation may seem notably non economic. In part that is typical of non­
economists' (whether ministers' or village women's) formulations - financial magnitudes and 
production are to them vital means or intermediate goals to other ends. In fact the focus is on 
production of water, food, health and education services and on a law/order context in which that 
can be done. The goal set is adequate to carry out a strategic planning exercise and, in principle,
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can be elaborated for targets and then iteratively programmed toward rolling and around 
operational budgeting.
Beneath and within the generality does lie contextuality. Somalia is a water scarce zone and war 
has devastated urban and rural, human and livestock access with only the urban even reasonably 
adequately restored (as of fall 1995 in Baidoa). Food supplies had returned to adequacy only in
1994 and were at risk from bad weather in 1995 even before the rise in violence. Over 1992-
1995 there had been a certain local/provincial law, order, mediation framework which had (until 
then) kept the peace and contained small outbreaks o f violence - thus his positing of 
continuing/improving peace and order as an overarch.
A schematic checklist by cluster includes:
1. Security-Law-Order
• Border defense to keep war out (or repel)
• Insurgency defense
• Day to day security from violent interference normal life by anyone (including army, 
police, politicians, officials, 'big men') by a user friendly civilian police force
• Operational, accessible magisterial courts with intelligible laws, consistency, impartiality, 
speed and honesty
2. Basic Service Access
• Water (human and livestock/crops)
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• Health Services (especially preventive, educational, primary curative)
• Education (especially primary and vocational/adult)
3. Livelihood Rehabilitation/Strengthening
• Facilitating return home/re-establishing farm (or trade)
• Ensuring access to inputs/knowledge (e.g. extension services/markets
• Avoidance needless/complex regulation
4. Provision Infrastructure
• Physical (e.g. rural roads, buildings and equipment for heads 1-2-3-5
• Institutional and Procedural (to operate 1-2-3-5)
• Market (ensuring there are commercial, transport, financial operators - preferably not 
governmental)
5. Provision Safety Nets
• Initial return home /demobilisation
• Calamity (e.g. drought) response
• Absolute poverty alleviation (aged, disabled, mother and child, epidemic e.g. HIV)
These are relatively similar to a strategic checklist for absolute poverty reduction planning, 
programming, budgeting in any African (probably any low average output per capita) country.
The differences are contextual relating to the starting point. Priorities and sequences relating to 
action turn on initial gaps and on which elements of each priority are crucial in allowing progress 
on other aspects of that priority and, especially, on other priority clusters.
In particular, law-order-security have higher priority - in resource allocations and timing - than in 
non-war contexts. It is quite true that law and order are never enough. It is, however, equally 
true that without some achieved levels of law, order and security there cannot be much e lse f1
'Resettlement' does not appear as a separate cluster. It is an initial stage o f livelihood and 
rehabilitation, usually means 'return home and is frequently so rapid that 'planned' support is 
overtaken by events. However, one aspect - demobilisation with economic/social reintegration is 
usually under-prioritised (at least in terms of resources deployed in articulated, relevant 
programmes). If young men with, and trained in the use of, guns (and often little else) with 
limited social/human capital are demobilised into absolute poverty with neither hope for 
themselves nor respect by others there will - or at least is very likely to be - insecurity and 
violence. This applies to all ex-combatants not only to 'victors' or to formal government troops.
The list is specifically intended to apply to R-R-R planning as sectoral planning - not to deny that 
overall fiscal and financial institutions and flows, arterial infrastructure, higher education, large 
nodal or growth pole projects/enterprises (whether the spin-offs are employment, input markets, 
foreign exchange earning and/or fiscal flows) are crucial. They are. But it is probably more 
practicable to pursue them in one or more sectoral planning process with systematic attention to 
linkages/feedbacks within a simple, overarching, macro strategic plan frame and iterative 
incorporation and reconciliation at programming and budgetary process stages.
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The perception o f all causes of conditions leading to violence - and of formulating them in ways 
facilitating specific means to reducing/reversing them - is important probably to any results and 
certainly to efficient resource allocations.
To argue that the removal o f a lid (in the African case colonialism) allows unresolved tensions to 
re-emerge and to intensify (the 'Balkan Model') is not wholly invalid. Nor is the statement that 
'ethnicity matters' albeit ethnicity/nationalism are frequently manipulated and used to deflect 
wrath''2 and can be (and are) used to build states and reduce tensions as well as the reverse. A 
somewhat different set o f propositions (points to study for operational implications) may be 
more useful to R-R-R planning:
1. Lawless and violent governments lead to lawless and violent people;
2. inclusion (or gaining power) at the centre not secession is the usual central demand of 
insurgency supporters;
3. cross border violence is usually the result, not the cause, of domestic war;
4. territorial identity/loyalty neither requires a central historical ’national culture and societal 
pattern nor automatically flows from it. Botswana and Tanzania (and particularly 
Somaliland) are nation states in the territorial loyalty and social capital sense but Tanzania is 
very diverse in 'historic nations' and none has irridentist ambitions in respect to the numbers 
of its 'historic nationals' living across present frontiers;
5. if a territorial state ceases to function (e.g. Sierra Leone, Zaire) territorial loyalty may persist 
but violence is likely to emerge -especially if the failed state makes spasmodic violent 
attempts to reassert its authority;
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6. perceived inequity - by exclusion or drawing off of resources with few, if any, flowing back - 
is much more likely to lead to intense alienation and violence than poverty and relatively low 
inward resource allocations. Bayelsa as the largest contributor to Nigeria's exports and fiscal 
flows believes it is robbed; Ngara in Tanzania is poor, at least until recently under-allocated 
but sees some central concern and results (most notably 1994 on preservation of law, order 
and security) and knows it is not being robbed to support Dar es Salaam.
Each proposition does lead to priority actions, e.g. In Nigeria the automatic allocation of shares 
o f oil revenues to producing and (at lower levels) other states and to the Federal Government was 
a unifying means. Its partial reinstatement is a move in the right direction but given the 
intervening period no longer enough by itself.
Similarly malgovernance can be broken down into components facilitating identification of 
actions to reverse them and to testing packages of measures for joint feasibility and (ordinal) 
efficiency:
1. the most pervasive form of malgovemance is non-governance i.e. failure to provide 
acceptable levels o f services in the five clusters cited relatively and increasingly broadly 
which are equitably accessible (people cannot live by participation, competitive elections and 
prudential financial sector regulation alone);
2. the most general lawlessness and resort to violence promoting aspects of malgovernance - 
after systemic violence - is systemic theft at upper and middle levels;'^3
3. waste matters because resources are scarce and because when gross it brings the government 
both political figures and public servants - into contempt;
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4. non-participation matters by reducing the perception of belonging, of having control over a 
range o f meaningful 'local' decisions and of being able to hold accountable. The forms of 
participation matter less than that they are seen as real and, to a degree at least, effective.5'1
In respect to perceptions of participation and of territorial national identity symbols and mixed 
symbolic/functional unifying means do matter - on occasion negatively as well as positively.
Here a planning technician can usually do little more than inform on costs and potential negative 
feedbacks.
Somaliland has invested very heavily in decision taker time for reconciliation conferences of 
guurti (elders who, in Somaliland, are close to and legitimate for most people), in electing a 
House o f Elders (strategic politics and political economy) and of Assembly (to oversee 
government operations) and a draft constitution with a pre finalisation/referendum 
consultation/dialogue process as well as in re-establishing a functioning magisterial to supreme 
court system, a civil police force, and a national army. All have functional roles but in addition 
(especially except for the courts and the army) they create a perception of participation (even if 
indirect) from household to country and of a state which is, but is also more than, a federation of 
sub clans.
Indigenous national - in the sense o f non European - languages are an example of instruments 
with different impacts in different contexts. The ideal is an indigenous language which is fairly 
broadly understood (even if imperfectly), easy to learn and the home language of a relatively 
weak group. In such a case - notably Swahili in Tanzania - the gains are real and the costs can be 
reduced by developing the language and by wide teaching of a secondary international language. 
Unfortunately the conditions are rarely met. If one region or elite would gain, the 'national'
32
language can prove more devisive than moving toward universal access to the colonial one - thus 
Mozambique's option for Portuguese over Swahili (or English) which was feared would 
disadvantage the Centre and North versus the South (or vica versa).55
What can be said about elaborating from the guidelines and checklists in particular countries at 
particular times? At case level a good deal but at that o f generalisations either rather less or with 
so many sets o f alternatives as to be neither portable, digestible nor printable.
Two sketches may illustrate what is likely to be practicable: one starting from a long collapsed 
state and severe damage to livelihoods and commerce as well as initial near total breakdown of 
law and order - Somaliland. The other is the context o f a functioning state and institutions with 
order and livelihood existing (even before the end of the war), albeit if attenuated, for perhaps 
half the population - Mozambique. Differences in professional personnel and data 
complementarity are almost as marked.56
In the first case the starting point for a planning process to identify goals, results to date and a 
limited number o f key actions/programmes which would solidify what has been achieved and 
have major, fairly rapid (2 to 4) year spillover in making possible a broader range o f targets.
Somaliland has law, order, security and a broadly shared sense of being a state. Basic 
institutions (central and local) including a public service are in place, but very weak because of 
exiguous resources including limited external official, personnel and investment flows because 
of non-recognition.
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Three priorities (paralleling incremental strengthening on other fronts) are identifiable:
1. Restoration o f government - including local - revenue collection from the order of $25 
million to $150 million (about an eighth of GNP) through import (not export and remittance) 
taxes for the central government and urban rates and service charges for the municipal ones. 
Devising simple systems and standard procedures plus training staff (requiring perhaps up to 
a dozen expatriate specialist professionals) should be attainable over 18 to 36 months with 
build-up to the goal ratio to GDP at - say - 60 months.
2. Restoration of the key Berbera-Harqeisa - Djijiga - Addis Ababa trade and transport 
backbone building from present UNCTAD channelled work at Berbera via an EU Horn 
Regional programme with Ethiopia. The $50-75 million cost (and related specialist 
personnel) over 3 to 5 years are not out of line with EU major regional project funding and 
require only Ethiopian involvement and EU acceptance of Somaliland as a ‘Region’ in EU 
sense not formal recognition.
3. Demobilisation and reintegration into civilian livelihoods of the 12,500 ‘surplus’ army 
personnel enlisted to place sub-clan militias in a disciplined national institution plus and 
livelihood training for the 5,000 (of 20,000) 1991 demobilisees who have not successfully 
built civilian livelihoods. Because skilled workers and artisans are in demand - in civil 
engineering and building construction - an eighteen month programme of training and labour 
intensive reconstruction (secondary infrastructure) would be feasible e.g. under ILO 
auspices. As it could be classed as humanitarian - even though underpinning security, social 
stability, poverty reduction and economic growth (and lightening the budget burden of food - 
shelter - clothing and pocket money for the ‘extra’ troops) EU, Nordic and Swiss plus
34
perhaps Japanese, UK and US should be attainable. Phased over five years the annual 
external cost would be of the order of $20 million (under $10 per Somalilander).
If these three strategic programmes could be done the domestic revenue, the trunk infrastructure 
rehabilitation and the recomtruction of secondary infrastructure and boosting of human capital 
and livelihoods would facilitate progress on basic services provision, sustained domestic growth, 
return of some diaspora professionals and - in practice - an extension to de facto  and toward de 
jure  recognition.
Mozambique’s planning process could be and was more formal. The approach suggested has 
been prepared for/presented to Somaliland decision takers ad hoc and may or may not be 
internalised and used in part - the Mozambican was part of an ongoing domestic planning 
process.
Because state institutions and decision takers existed during the war with substantial pre to post 
war continuity, a pre peace strategic plan could usefully be set out in 1992 drawing on 
experience with survival support during the war. It was explicitly a strategic sectoral plan 
intended to be iteratively integrated into the comprehensive macro economic planning process.
The components were livelihood rehabilitation (including supporting activities including rural 
trade and transport), basic services return to war ravaged areas and local level infrastructure 
(including municipal and provincial decentralised governance and market access institutions). 
Security (except demobilisation into livelihood rehabilitation) was in a separate exercise. 
Linkages, multipliers (estimated at about 1 i.e. total GDP impact 2 times direct household 
production) and impact on external and fiscal balance were estimated as were progress toward 
food security (including household production for own use) and absolute poverty reduction.
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The projected results were positive - over five years 50% output gain over early 1990’s GDP, 
basic food balance in non-drought years except for wheat and vegetable oil, self sustaining on 
fiscal and external account (for the results of the strategic planning exercise, not the economy as 
a whole) by year six.
The external cost of perhaps $1,500 million over five years ($20 per Mozambican per year) was 
proposed to be met by shifting survival support (Emergencia was $350 to $500 million a year), 
UNHCR support o f refugees ($150 million a year) and the committed 
demobilisation/reintegration component o f UNOMOZ ($200 million) to the Reconstruction 
Sector phasing down over five years as domestic feedback payoff rose.
The planning process - except in cases such as food production and to a lesser extent rural 
household consumption poverty reduction turning largely on peace and order and on removal of 
restrictions - was a failure. The proposed funding sources were transferred to other countries (or 
donor budget tightening). External official financial sources - especially the Bank and the Fund 
- did not so much criticise Reconstrucao as treat it as peripheral (perhaps as component of safety 
nets) not integral to overall macro economic strategy. In particular basic services restoration 
was constrained even when initial period non-inflationary external finance was to hand while 
main roads were overfinanced at levels engrossing almost all rural capital expenditure..
The Mozambican experience calls attention to the external actors’ role. R-R-R is more national 
and contextual than - say - dams or prudential regulation of banks. Therefore the necessary 
level o f national parameter setting should be higher and the involvement in specific permutations 
greater. This is especially true because external financial sources appear to give much lower 
priority to R-R-R than to either survival support or ‘standard development’ and also to focus on
36
those aspects o f governance of special relevance to macro economic frameworks and to foreign 
enterprises with much less attention to the aspects o f direct concern to the vast majority of 
households.
Unfortunately countries in which R-R-R is a central strategic priority are typified y low levels of 
domestic resource availability and weak human, physical and institutional infrastructures as well 
as governance capabilities. They cannot proceed with the more financial resource intensive 
aspects of R-R-R very rapidly without significant external resources, human as well as financial.
The apparent sectoral and territorial exceptions appear to be special cases. Mozambique has met 
the target of being basically food self sufficient (except for wheat and vegetable oil) in non­
drought years. Peace, return home, removal of state barriers to trade were sufficient to achieve 
that goal - seen as laughable when formulated in 1992. But donor conditionality (even more 
than resource commitments) has blocked generalisation of basic services and ‘low’ level 
infrastructure.
In Somaliland massive remittances (of the order of 75% of GDP and over 40% of GNP) have 
facilitated rapid advance in some aspects of R-R-R but not fiscal rehabilitation so that basic 
services and infrastructural rehabilitation lag badly. The paucity of technical 
assistance/conditionality flowing from non-recognition has enabled (forced) Somalilanders to set 
their own strategic priorities, but the parallel absence o f specialised professional inputs and 
revenue for large programmes limit implementation.
Similarly with external NGOs - New Government Options to donors, New Governance 
Overarches for themselves, National Growth Obstacles to many recipients. Integration into 
national strategies is practicable together with catalytic perception - priority - programming
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impact which becomes internalised e.g. UNICEF, which is widely seen as akin to an ideal NGO 
even if it clearly is UN family agency. So is cooperation within - local governmental and 
community frames, e.g. ActionAid in Mozambique. Even basically anti state bodies, if 
competent, may be ideal for sur cal support channelling during war and in other non­
governance settings - e.g. Medecins Sans Frontieres in contested rural areas in Mozambique to 
1993. But the generalised use o f semi anarchically autonomous NGOs accountable to external 
donors and to their own lenders' consciences and visions to deliver R-R-R (and basic services) 
fragments and erodes both governmental and civil society capacity and rehabilitation. 
Domestically designed and driven, partly donor funded and programmed is a fairly easy over­
arching goal to prescribe but one much harder to get official donors, NGOs and many African 
governments to internalise and act upon consistently.
IV
WHAT WAYS FORWARD? (OR NOT)
The case for the usefulness and practicability of Post War Rehabilitation Planning appears to be 
fairly robust as does actual or potential interest on the part o f several African governments. The 
examples of Somaliland and Mozambique suggest that adaptation to different contexts/starting 
points is feasible. The most immediate constraint on post war rehabilitation planning is its 
marginalisation outside main resource allocation processes. The first step toward loosening that 
constraint is to enter into wider dialogue and debate on potential and observed positive and 
negative factors. Assuming that the process has something to offer, being ignored or treated to 
minor handouts as a form of safety net or survival support is much more damaging than serious 
open controversy.
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0The analytical aspects of the dialogue and debate would serve a second function - exploring 
certain key relationships/aspects not adequately incorporated (except by assumption) into 
rehabilitation planning - notably gender.57
In parallel both because of present value and to broaden the base o f available experience for 
analysis and dialogue, rehabilitation planning processes should be continued as, where and to the 
extent possible. This is probably useful even if in the end particular components are removed 
and fitted into a more comprehensive and macro economic planning exercise ad hoc. At least in 
that case their relative importance and linkages would be more fully understood.
To plan is to choose and to choose necessarily includes to choose not to do or to give very low 
priority (which with very scarce resources as in most post war contexts comes to the same thing). 
In the case of Post-war Rehabilitation Planning however the evidence supports choosing to go 
forward on the analytical, operational and feedback/evaluation fronts.
Ref: RHG/lab/br/scusa. doc 03/09/99
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ENDNOTES
1. There is no standard definition o f any of these concepts. Therefore, for transparency (to the 
author as well as the audience) studies do require working definitions. While some basic terms 
and elements are broadly global others are contextual. The limitation of the present study to 
SSA relates to the author's field and operational experience.
2. A strategic 20 year plan toward universal literacy, universal access to primary and basic 
vocational education, 33% to tertiary (broadly defined) education does have goals, resource 
requirement estimates, a time frame, paths forward and interim targets and, logically, much more 
precise three and one year components which could also be termed rolling and annual budgets.
3. This example illustrates the importance of context. In post war Somaliland most 
Somalilanders, the liberation movement and the subsequent government viewed reestablishment 
o f a civilian, user friendly police force and a functioning, honest judicial system as immediate 
strategic priorities (and ones only the state could provide). Therefore relatively large 
institutional and policy - as well as finance and personnel - allocations were made to them 
relative to health, water and education. The nature of probable desired tradeoffs in - say - 
Tanzania or (even more) Botswana is quite different.
4. Seeking to unify goals may be much more damaging than keeping them separate. In Nigeria 
during General Obasanjo's first presidency the quite plausible strategic goal o f an integrated iron 
and steel industry and of building up development poles in all or most states sabotaged each 
other with disastrous effects for both. Failure to focus on low cost (including transport), iron ore, 
limestone, natural gas inputs and on transport friendly (for external and domestic markets) 
location patterns in order to scatter large but ill related (and sometimes utterly ill chosen 
substantively - e.g. Enugu, coal resuscitation), bits among many states doomed the steel project 
to high costs, delays and poor productivity and created rather more dead-weight than growth pole 
objects. Certainly a substantial economic focal point (public or private) was needed at or near 
Enugu both economically and as a credible embodiment of post civil war reconciliation. But to 
seek to revive the failed coal mine lumbered the steel industry with excess costs and brought 
little in the way of jobs or input purchases to Enugu. The base failing in this case was largely 
technical. Professional opponents o f the Enugu and Jebba portions of the steel industry plaster 
man failed to make intelligible the fact that they were not opposing regional growth centres but 
to destroying steel industry viability by a plethora of unviable units which would be regional 
drag not growth points. Their credibility was further damaged by not proposing a regional 
economic stimulus programme of - at least potentially - viable projects.
5. Even the Mozambican, Angolan and Ethiopian 1990's planning processes were dominantly 
financial with national targets weakly (if at all) related to policy or resource inputs.
6. Institutional territorial struggles between Planning and Finance Ministries (or among wings of 
combined Planning-Economic Affairs -Finance ministries) do not provide an adequate 
explanation. For example in Tanzania in the 1960's and 1970's the curious division o f labour 
was that Planning handled capital planning and annual capital budgets while the Treasury
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handled recurrent and overall. On policy, Planning handled medium term strategic priorities 
(often very vaguely) and Finance operationalisation and operation and on analysis Planning long 
term macro and Finance short and medium term analysis at macro through micro levels and 
feedback to policy. Not surprisingly with the non trivial exception of the strategic formulation 
process leading to a plan, the Ministry of Finance/Treasury (and especially its analysis and 
policy wings) dominated. In practice relationships were not so much bad - at least as perceived 
from Finance which had a significant role in the process of plan formation and a dominant one at 
other times - as unlikely to be particularly efficient. The capital budgeting should have moved to 
the Treasury and much more the analysis, policy development and monitoring roles to Planning.
7. World Bank Structural Adjustment Programmes - at least in their initial segments - were a 
clear example o f  this variety of planning. As the time frame extended by accretion from three to 
five to over 20 years they became less focussed as to targets, more concerned with strategic goals 
and arguably less appropriate than more clearly defined interacting Sustainable (lm) Balance 
restoration and Strategic Objective planning integrated via three year rolling and one year 
operational Budgeting processes.
8. Arguably Botswana is an exception. It still has comprehensive national planning exercises 
into which poverty reduction and drought response components are integrated and which do 
inform the Budgetary Process. It is no aspersion on this achievement to note that the relatively 
rapid sustained growth of output, the structural factors that cause this growth to generate export 
and fiscal buoyancy, the success of regional efforts (in which Botswana participated) to make its 
region safer and less security intensive (e.g. the 'new' South Africa, independent Namibia, 
Mozambique at peace) and the high levels o f international official resources providing time and 
space for adjustment are so atypically favourable (globally as well as in respect to SSA) as to 
create massive obstacles to applying 'lessons of experience from Botswana' elsewhere in SSA.
9. This is not to ignore other causal factors on the political culture and armed conflict fronts but 
to suggest that - especially in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic - more co­
ordinated initial planning could have reduced early costs and brought forward recovery gains and 
in others - e.g. Romania, Bulgaria - reduced costs in ways conclusive to creating socio political 
gains consistent with sustainable restructuring and recovery.
10 There is no contention here that these clusters of goals are largely competitive. They are in 
large measure complementary and to reduce any to negligible planning allocations is likely, by 
feedback, to block others. But at the marginal/incremental resource allocation face there are 
trade offs.
11 The law and order priority in rehabilitation contexts as opposed to more “normal” ones is an 
example. This may not relate as much to the absolute levels (targets) of law and order or 
resources allocated toward achieving them as to the degree and speed of change required and, 
consequentially, share o f total resources allocated to it. Just arguably Somalilands police force is 
more effective and user friendly than Tanzania but the most notable differences are that it is over 
two officers per 1000 persons versus under one and accounts for about half o f non-army public
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servants as under a tenth because of greater need to reintroduce and to consolidate (as opposed to 
sustain) law and order and much more limited state resources relative to population or GNP.
12 The external NGO debate is an example. Whatever external NGO’s can do they cannot be 
user accountable, nationally integrative, (with exceptions) state legitimacy building, or 
generalised basic service providing even if they can be valuable emergency gap fillers and useful 
supporters to governmental and civil society led programmes perhaps particularly at local 
government and domestic social organisation levels. Unleashing hundreds of them in a 
rehabilitation context -  and redirecting the largest share o f non infrastructure and macro 
economic policy support resources through them - fairly inevitably erodes, corrodes, fragments 
and risks dissolving state and government (at local and regional/provincial/state as well as 
national levels) no matter what the intentions. To paraphrase Socrates as paraphrased by Plato -  
the unexamined plan is not worth planning.
13 Tanzania since 1994 has had up to 10,000 troops on or near its Congo-Rwanda-Burundi 
borders and another 10,000 forward deployed for quick movement paralleled by a 
disproportionate allocation of police to these areas. Their purposes are to ensure that wars are 
effectively prohibited/deterred immigrants and refugees do not covertly subvert domestic law 
and order by external wars. This is not a cheap exercise -  arguably it engrosses 10 % of 
Tanzania’s non-debt service recurrent budget. But is it a bad allocation in either socio-political 
or economic terms? What would the costs to Tanzania of Central African wars spilling onto 
Tanzanian soil or their refugees remaining (as they did in then Zaire) directly involved in the 
wars they had fled have been?
14 This is not a mindlessly optimistic view of the potential of technicians/decision informers 
and technico/political decision taker participation in an iterative goals -  targets -  means -  
allocations planning process. The Tanzania and Zimbabwean ministries of finance in the 1970’s 
and 1980’s respectively and the Mozambican after 1988 followed that type of critical response 
within the overall security goal framework with significant impact. Since the Portuguese never 
invaded Tanzania nor the South Africans Zimbabwe and the Amin's invasion of Tanzania and 
the Renamo-South African 1986-7 campaign to deconstruct Mozambique and isolate Zimbabwe 
were decisively repulsed, it is hard to argue that the “Treasury hands” interactions seriously 
weakened national security.
15 There are contexts in which participating in planning either as a technician/decision informer 
or as a semi technocratic/semi political decision taker may be humanly unacceptable because of 
the goals the process seeks to further and the probable results of the more efficient allocation of 
resources to further them. If the key decision taking elite are committed only to survival and 
personal accumulation and aggrandisement, intermediate strata to survival and lucrative or semi 
lucrative niche procurement, most people to survival, passive resistance and avoidance -  
Mobuto’s Zaire for a third of a century -  a planning process (even if little related to formal plan 
and even budget documents and pronouncements) is possible. Judging by the amounts engrossed 
and the length of survival, Mobuto’s planning process was relatively efficient. As the costs 
included deconstruction of the state and the economy erosion of human and social capital -  not 
least order, law and justice -  and immiserisation of a very large majority of Zairois the inevitable
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•end consequence was either implosion or explosion and the effect of greater allocative efficiency 
in prolonging the process negative. But for a Zairois the choice of participating to mitigate or 
(optimistically) to broaden and humanise goals, of standing by to await implosion and of moving 
to active resistance was never easy. In Malawi (under Kamuzu Banda) and Nigeria (under 
General Abacha) many able, decent people chose the second course waiting for Banda to die and 
some event to fracture the Abacha regime (in the event an Act o f God) as opposed to either 
participating or revolting and, in the event, were probably justified in doing so.
16. This definition does not imply that high levels of tension and/or coup d'etats are benign nor 
that transitions like that in Nigeria are non-problematic and benign (especially as a civil war in 
two or three key oil producing states is a real risk). It simply argues that they are different in 
kind to the aftermaths of war in e.g. Rwanda, Burundi, Mozambique, Somaliland, Sierra Leone 
or Liberia (assuming in the last two cases war is ended not merely temporarily suspended).
17. Not all civil wars result in state failure as sketched. The Mozambican one certainly limited 
the geographic area in which the state was effective and its operational capability even there but 
a perfectly recognisable state existed. The same has, to date, characterised Angola and the post 
genocide Rwanda state
18. Perception, as linked to and as independent from reality matters. Somaliland - then 
independent - voted against union with Somalia and was annexed by force. Thus the perception 
that 1985-91 was a liberation struggle even though during the pre-Barre civilian era 
Somalilanders had become more integrated into the then United Republic and the restored 
Republic of Somaliland's President Egal was the Prime Minister of the United Republic ousted 
by General Barre.
19. The external context factor is one which affects the likelihood of the conflict spreading. Had 
the Interahamwe not been given the time and resources to consolidate, reorganise and strike back 
from then Eastern Zaire not only would rehabilitation in Rwanda had a far more propitious 
context but the expansion of the war to both Congos, Uganda, the Central African Republic and 
Zimbabwe would have been averted (possibly at the cost of delaying the implosion o f the 
Mobutu regime by a few years). This incidentally illustrates bad international humanitarian and 
peacekeeping planning. The failure to allocate resources to prevent IH from using the Zaire 
camps as rehabilitation centres and bases has been costly (even to the Security Council member 
states) out o f proportion to money/lives 'saved'. That the exercise would have been possible is 
illustrated by the fact that Tanzania - which planned and prioritised more effectively with less 
resources - largely succeeded in preventing any such consolidation and resurgence of IH in its 
territory.
20. In general this is not a one instrument per target case. e.g. Reestablishment (or 
establishment) of a competent, user friendly civilian police force contributes to social 
reconstruction by creating peace/law/order and to enhanced production by reducing risk, damage 
or theft and transport costs. The police force needs to be complemented by a just, intelligible 
legal code and an impartial, honest, accessible primary court system.
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21. The last point is consistent with IMF and World Bank positions. They are not opponents of 
all regulation or market intervention but against types they believe place serious constraints on 
production and do little to further level playing field competition or prevent enterprise or public 
servant abuses. For example, they - like many large financial enterprises - advocate more 
prudential scrutiny and regulation o f banks.
22. This question is indep. ident of the public - private one. Private sugar industry rebuilding 
would require infrastructural reconstruction, probably domestic guaranteed prices/purchase 
levels and other open or camouflaged subsidies.
23. A good test may be the proportion of refugees and internally displaced persons who choose 
to "return home'. In Mozambique (like Kosovo) it has been very high and rapid while in Angola 
(like Sri Lanka) it has been limited and slow.
24. The needs for livelihood rehabilitation, access to basic services and to infrastructure 
(including markets) and civil law, order, policing are immediate. Failure to act toward at least 
most of them will rapidly erode support for/suspension of disbelief in the new governmental 
structures and processes. External donors in this context are very risk averse in a perverse way - 
they make substantial rehabilitation support to bankrupt governments in devastated economies 
conditional on prior achievement o f the targets for which the resources are needed.
25. Because the SPLA has created an alliance with the two main (75% of vote in North in past 
reasonably free and fair elections) Northern democratic parties (Umma, NDP), agreed a 
Confederal/Federal (within each region) Constitution to be confirmed (or not) by referendum 
after five years, trained 5,000 Umma military cadres and co-operated with them on the North­
eastern front, the least unlikely result would appear to be the fall of the Khartoum 
(military/minority fraction of Sudanese Islam) regime and a relatively decentralised, quasi 
participatory governance structure for the whole of the Sudan. The date depends on the degree 
of external support SPLA-Umma-NDP can muster relative to that which Khartoum can acquire 
and on a stable Ethiopian-Eritrean peace to allow fuller access to the Northeast and East. Five to 
ten years may be a reasonable estimate. Therefore any detailed rehabilitation planning exercise 
today would be unlikely to have much value - unless conducted by the SPLA-Umma-NDP for 
symbolic and mobilisation purposes.
26. Most refugees in camps do want to take part in education, basic service provision and/or 
production. However, in few instances have a majority been able to do so. (SWAPO of 
Namibia's Angolan settlement camps were exceptions). A higher proportion are able to do so 
when living 'unofficially' with kinsfolk as in the case of Mozambican refugees in Northern 
Malawi and South-eastern Tanzania.
27. Ignoring multiplier effects (small farming families have been, and in peaceful countries 
usually are, major markets for urban goods, the basic suppliers of urban food and, to a degree, 
production inputs and the users of a substantial proportion of commerce and transport) and 
related linkage elements whose non incorporation is simply inefficient planning. Further 
because reducing macro imbalances (including food, basic service access and legitimacy) to 
sustainable levels rapidly is crucial any programme treated as an add on will, in practice, be
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grossly underfunded - no matter what most citizens' or the states' priorities may be - because 
external financial sources will not take it seriously.
28. The method used is that of UNICEF’s 1987 and 1989 Children on the Front Line studies of 
Southern Africa. In the case of Mozambique population projection data for 1994 exceeded 
actual population -  after the vast majority of refugees had come home -  by about 2,5000,000, 
suggesting the excess mo; iality during war estimates were of the right order of magnitude.
29. Arguably this is to overestimate. The first drought/dearth which did not lead to mass famine 
in Ethiopia was 1994-95 under the present government. In 1974 massive famine deaths were a 
cause, not a consequence, of the overthrow of the Emperor Hailie Selassie’s regime.
30. In Iraq proper, even with limited violence on the ground but with inefficient distribution and 
lack of access to adequate food, pure water, preventative educational and basic curative health 
services under five, mortality has more than doubled and risen absolutely by about 80 per 1,000.
31. In SSA since 1960 (and to an only somewhat lesser extent since 1920)droughts and dearths 
(major losses to food crop harvests) have not resulted in famines with substantial loss o f life with 
the known exception o f Ethiopia (and perhaps Italian Somaliland). Motorised transport and 
access to imported food make that possible, but war prevents distribution even in the absence of 
any ‘starve out the enemy’ strategy.
32. Genocide is defined here as a systematic strategy o f eliminating an ethnic group or sub­
group, not as jaquerie-type uprisings even when manipulated (as in Nigeria in 1965 and Rwanda 
in 1959-60). There are three clear cases. Burundi in the early 1970’s and since 1994 and 
Rwanda from 1994 (Interahamwe still exists, is still committed to genocide and still, kills on 
average of at least a score of human beings a day in Rwanda).
33. Massacres have been predominantly in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Uganda (under Amin),
Angola, Mozambique, Sudan and Ethiopia (including then occupied Eritrea).
34. Mass wilful amputation is largely concentrated in Sierra Leone and Liberia, ear and nose 
cropping was a typical Renamo tactic in Mozambique.
35. Also broadly on the UNICEF estimation basis of reasonably projected GDP in the absence 
of war with actual
36. This GDP cost applies also to states e.g. Zimbabwe, Tanzania which have incurred large 
extra military expenditure either to deter/repulse spill-over wars or invasions with success 
(neither has had major war or insurgency on its own soil) and/or (Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Nigeria) 
to provide military combat support to other states in its region to prevent their collapse and/or to 
seek to make peace.
37 This cost continues even once growth is restored because it resumes from a lower base.
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38. If the relatives o f the massacred and the mutilated - especially those in the de facto  National 
Guard, the Kamajors - do seek to exact retribution (as many watuts', within and without the army 
were inclined in Rwanda), it is very doubtful the government will (unlike the RPA government 
in Rwanda) be strong enough to block them. However, the most probable short term prospect in 
Sierra Leone - recurrent outbre"ks of violence and quite probably near full scale war because of 
an inherently unsound 'peace' ug.eement - renders such speculation at the least premature.
39. Assuming of course that full scale civil war does not break out in Russia the Kashmiri civil 
war lead to another full scale India-Pakistan war, neither Iran-Iraq implode and/or return to war 
with its neighbour nor Indonesia dissolve into a series o f overlapping civil wars.
40. On occasion ‘forward deterrence’ has been practised. Angola’s participation in the removal 
of the Lissouba regime in Congo (Brazzaville) and the defence of President Kabila’s in Congo 
(Democratic) are basically forward deterrence to deny UNITA bases and links to the outside 
world. Ethiopia’s support for Somalian forces inimical to Sergeant Aideed is consequential on 
seeking to destroy Ogadeni ravanchist terrorist bases in the Lugh area.
41. The cost is largely independent of the motivation. Tanzania has acted primarily because it 
views violence as contagious and out of solidarity and only secondarily for self protection 
whereas in its Mozambican involvement keeping the Beira Corridor open and a credible 
Mozambican state in being were vital Zimbabwean interests.
42 Integration oriented groups o f states have political, social, humanitarian as well as economic 
reasons to try to render their neighbourhoods safe by mediating, containing, ending civil wars in 
member states and bordering ones. SADCC, ECOWAS and IGAD have rec ognised and sought 
to act on this principle.
43. Again the cost is largely independent of the motivation. Nigeria’s early Liberian 
intervention in Liberia may in large part have been intended to defend Generals Babangida's and 
Abacha’s friend, Sergeant Samuel Doe and throughout has included a will to at least regional 
prestige as well a genuine concern that state collapse and civil war are contagious and that there 
is an imperative to limit and end mass barbarism where possible.
44. The external wa Hutu opposition to the wa Tutsi military establishment in power in Burundi 
is not uniformly genocidal. However, some transcripts o f its Radio Democracy read as virtual 
paraphrases of the former Radio Milles Collines -  the voice that called Rwanda to genocide -  
with only the names o f places and people changed.
45. Two studies were done at the instigation of the Tanzanian government using substantial UN 
agency personnel inputs. Both reached similar conclusions albeit the second (via UNICEF) 
examined distributional, workload and ecological issues in more depth.
46. Targets do matter but up to a point, sustained movement in the intended direction is an 
acceptable second best. Whether universal child vaccination and mother and child care is 
achieved in year 10 or year 15 is probably less important (not unimportant) than whether a set of
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institutions, policies and allocations steadily driving up the achieved percentages are put and kept 
in place.
47. The overarch could be called a model but - for historic reasons - this carries overtones of 
data input levels, mathematical * rogramming, linearity not usually appropriate to Africa.
48. This test is fairly good for avoiding gross error and especially its repetition. It is less so for 
determining efficiency i.e. avoiding allocating more resources than needed. In 1973 rapid, 
epidemic advance o f coffee berry disease threatened 5.7 year wipe out to the main producing 
area in Tanzania. Copper Sulphate could slow advance (perhaps halt). Different scientific 
evidence on how much needed and how dangerous scattered untreated farms to treated 
neighbours. Therefore subsidised copper sulphate (partly clawed back in marketing process) at 
levels upper middle end of range studies indicated (not lowest study as Agriculture but not 
Coffee Research - Coffee Bound - Treasury supported) was introducted. This worked - 
catastrophic risk averted. But some (never all or most) was smuggled to Kenya (where not 
subsidised) and use continued widespread and epidemic did not recur when subsidy ended in 
1980's. Weakness in lack of latel970's follow up research on how much really was needed, 
learning effect, and whether protected farms loss at risk from unprotected neighbours was much 
lower than believed.
49. There are exceptions to that generalisation but they appear to be in contexts in which one or 
two committed domestic or external actors can raise initial resources, demonstrate results and 
win approval o f main macro economic decision takers for continuation e.g. universal 
vaccination/immunisation as spearheaded by UNICEF with a growing number o f African heal 
ministers and officials. In practice that approach is practicable only if resources needed are 
relatively small (compared to total uses) and are to a significant degree non fungible and 
additional (carrot conditionality).
50. Set out in dialogue with author, Baidoa, September 1995. Just how high the degree of 
uncertainty is in many rehabilitation cases is illustrated by the fact that he was already engaged 
in the district's defence and Baidoa fell a week later with significant 1993-95 water, food security 
and (to a lesser extent) health, education and local governance gains wiped out (or at least badly 
damaged and put on hold) literally overnight.
51. The criticism of the nightwatchman state as inadequate of the 1950's through 1970's and - 
beginning slightly later - of the deformation of'law ' and order as oppression were valid if 
perhaps overdone. They are not inconsistent with accepting the need for law, order and security 
(in senses meaningful and acceptable to ordinary people/producers) as vital.
52. In Nigeria in 1965 the basic grievances of Northern and Middlebelt peoples were against the 
ruling Northern (Hausa/Fulani) elites. The elites skilfully refocused and manipulated their wrath 
against the middle tier outsiders (the Ibo) who served and profited from the elite but were not the 
decision takers. The result was pogroms against the Ibo and the catalyst to the Biafran war 
(initially o f succession, later toward conquest of Southern Nigeria).
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53. The 'corruption o f need' engulfing lower and middle level public servants - including the two 
thirds who are primary school teachers, nurses, constables, agricultural extensions and rural 
water officers - who cannot possibly live on their pay is damaging but less so. Their need is 
usually comprehended and their privatised, generalised, decentralised user fees grumblingly 
accepted if they do provide services. That it would be much more efficient for the state to pay 
them living emoluments remains valid.
54. 'Traditional', ad hoc community based or more formally elected bodies from village to 
national level can be successful if listening to and seen as legitimate by those for whom they 
speak or work and also perceived to produce some useful product (not just words and 
aspirations).
55. Thus the regular extension of the co-official language role of English in India where not only 
the South but also Bengal and Bombay perceive Hindi alone as disadvantageous to them and the 
de facto  (probably increasing) role of English parallel to the official Tagulag in the Philippines 
which may end bilingual. The opposite case is Sri Lanka where Sinhala only was - correctly - 
perceived as anti Tamil Chauvinism and proved deeply derisive (as well as functionally costly).
56. For simplicity, recurrence of armed conflict is excluded that assumption does characterise 
Mozambique from 1992 and Somaliland from 1995.
57. Given initial unequal access, generalisation of basic services should benefit women.
Similarly because water collection weighs heavily on women and girls improved provision 
should allow reallocation o f time - especially to schooling for girl children. But such premises - 
as in planning in respect to gender in general - require examinations both as to validity and 
specification and as to what complementary measures (not least in sectors which, on the face of 
it, have little direct gender content). This was done to some extent in the Mozambican case but 
not in the Somaliland one.
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